for the translation from Tibetan, we thank Atisha Mathur and Davide Lionetti
What is the definition and what are the divisions of valid cognition (pramāṇa) according to Buddhist schools, and what are the differences among them?
From the Vaibhāṣika to the Madhyamaka Svātantrika philosophical systems, valid cognition (1) is characterized by being a new realization, whereas for the Prāsaṅgika, valid cognition does not necessarily have to be a new realization, and for them, a mere non-deceptive consciousness can be asserted as valid cognition. Here, the important point concerns two different reasons. The first reason is as follows: the reason why it is said from the Vaibhāṣika to the Madhyamaka Svātantrika that valid cognition must necessarily "realize in a new way" is that in the Sanskrit language, the word is pramāṇa, where the first part pra- corresponds to the meaning of first and the other part māṇa is explained as knowledge, hence a first knowledge, and for this reason, it is said that it must be non-deceptive and that it realizes in a new way, and this reason is given accordingly.
The illustrious Prāsaṅgika system asserts that this word pra– can have various meanings: first, principal, superior, and so forth, therefore it can be understood as principal. Hence, a consciousness that is non-deceptive with respect to its principal object is a valid cognition. These different ways of defining valid cognition stem from different interpretations of the Sanskrit word pramāṇa.
The second reason is as follows: From the Vaibhāṣika system to the Madhyamaka Svātantrika system, it is stated that if something exists, it must exist "by its own essence, by its own nature." If something exists, when seeking the thing in question, something real must be findable beyond mere designation. If something does not meet these conditions, then it cannot be asserted as existing at the conventional level. According to the Prāsaṅgika system, however, if something exists, it is merely designated by a word. Outside of its nominal existence, it is not possible to find an essence that is not imputed when the designated object is sought. Due to this ontological difference, we observe two different views, distinct regarding the object of negation, and this is the main point.
Therefore, from the Madhyamaka Svātantrika downwards, it is precisely stated that cognition, to be valid, must be a new realization. For them, it is not possible to assert as valid cognition only a consciousness that is non-deceptive and considered valid according to mundane conventions. Furthermore, since it is asserted that when seeking the designated object it must be found as something not merely imputed, it is said that valid cognition must be a new realization of this type of existence. For the Prāsaṅgika, it is not so; just as mundane conventions consider a consciousness valid when it is non-deceptive, similarly, the Prāsaṅgika system accepts the presentation of mundane conventions. When the glorious Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra says, "Do not destroy mundane conventions," it means that from the philosophical systems of the Svātantrika downwards, they contradict the presentation that is in accordance with mundane conventions. What is accepted according to the conventions of the world is also accepted by the Prāsaṅgika system. Candrakīrti says, "Worldly people debate with me, but I do not debate with worldly people because what is accepted by worldly people, I also accept." The important point concerns the difference in how the ontological status of things is described by the Prāsaṅgika and others, where the Prāsaṅgika accept a merely nominal existence. They arrive at this conclusion because they accept that something objectively existing cannot be found when seeking the referent of words (nomai) and thoughts (imputations, designations).
Regarding the enumeration of valid cognition into two types, namely 1) direct valid cognition and 2) inferential valid cognition, this relates to the division of objects of knowledge into two categories. This division is consistent across all Buddhist philosophical systems. However, from the Madhyamaka Svātantrika downwards, this division of valid cognitions into two pertains to the division of objects of knowledge into the two categories of generally characterized phenomena and specifically characterized phenomena. Whereas for the Prāsaṅgika, since objects of knowledge are divided into manifest phenomena and hidden phenomena, valid cognition is subdivided into direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition. All systems use the division of objects of knowledge to subdivide valid cognition into two. However, the objects of knowledge belonging to these two subdivisions differ according to the respective explanations. Therefore, in the root text of the Pramāṇavārttika, it is stated: "from two objects of knowledge, arise two valid cognitions." In this manner, direct valid cognition, which apprehends specifically characterized phenomena, is direct valid cognition, while inferential valid cognition, which apprehends generally characterized phenomena, is inferential valid cognition. Thus, valid cognition is divided in these two ways. On the other hand, for the Prāsaṅgika, dividing objects of knowledge into manifest and hidden phenomena, direct valid cognition, which knows manifest objects of knowledge without relying on a sign, is direct valid cognition. Meanwhile, inferential valid cognition, which knows hidden objects of knowledge depending on a sign, is inferential valid cognition. Therefore, in the Prāsaṅgika system, the definition of direct valid cognition is a consciousness that, without relying on a correct sign, is non-deceptive with respect to its principal object. Conversely, the definition of inferential valid cognition is a cognition that, depending on a correct sign, is non-deceptive with respect to its principal object..
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(1) designated, named, and imputed are used as synonyms.
What is the reason why the four Buddhist philosophical systems assert differently the definition of direct valid cognition?
In the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Sautrāntika systems, direct cognition is always non-erroneous. The rationale behind this is that these systems accept external objects, unlike the other philosophical systems, meaning that a consciousness is erroneous with respect to the appearance of externality of phenomena. By accepting external objects, they do not assert that consciousness is erroneous with respect to the appearance of external objects. For the same reason, even the Madhyamaka Svātantrika cannot assert the appearance of true existence to a sensory consciousness. Therefore, for example, a visual consciousness apprehending a vase is not an erroneous consciousness because it is not influenced by temporary or prolonged causes of error. Due to this, they accept that this visual consciousness apprehending the vase is a direct valid cognition and that it is non-erroneous. Now, the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Yogācāra assert that concerning direct cognitions, these can be both erroneous and non-erroneous. For example, this visual consciousness apprehending the vase is a direct cognition and is also an erroneous consciousness. The reason why it is so lies in the fact that, being influenced by prolonged causes of error, which are the imprints of ignorance, objects appear as established externally, and therefore, this consciousness is erroneous with respect to the factor of appearance of external objects. Therefore, it is said to be an erroneous consciousness, and this is the difference regarding systems that respectively accept external objects and those that do not accept external objects.
The glorious Prāsaṅgika system accepts external objects. However, it asserts an erroneous consciousness in the sense that it is erroneous with respect to the appearance of true existence. For example, a visual consciousness apprehending a vase is erroneous with respect to the appearance of the vase, which appears as if it truly exists. For the Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Sautrāntika and Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Yogācāra systems, the truly existing entity, which is the object of negation, cannot appear to sensory consciousnesses. The source of this assertion is found in the distinction of the two truths by Ācārya Jñānagarbha. He states that the object of negation, the "truly existing" entity, does not appear to sensory consciousnesses. This is stated by Je Tsongkhapa in his text called "Illumination of the Intended Meaning" to be asserted by the Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Sautrāntika. According to the Prāsaṅgika system, the consciousness in the continuum of a sentient being that directly realizes emptiness is not an erroneous consciousness. Apart from this, all other consciousnesses are erroneous and are consciousnesses to which the truly existing entity appears. Therefore, concerning a consciousness that is not influenced by the imprints of ignorance, this, in the continuum of a sentient being, is a mind that directly realizes emptiness, and except for this, all other minds are influenced by the imprints of ignorance. If a consciousness is influenced by the imprints of ignorance, then it is pervaded by being a consciousness to which the truly established entity appears, and thus becomes an erroneous consciousness. Therefore, concerning direct cognition, there are erroneous direct cognitions and non-erroneous direct cognitions. This is an important point.
Then, for the Prāsaṅgika system in general, "manifest" and "direct" are synonymous. Therefore, if something is direct, it does not necessarily have to be a consciousness. Moreover, concerning direct consciousnesses, there are conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses. The main point for which, in the Prāsaṅgika system, "manifest" and "direct" are synonymous is that, in worldly conventional terms, "direct" or "manifest" are understood in the same way. Furthermore, the glorious Candrakīrti clearly states: "All objects that exist in the world are directly observable, so they are not hidden phenomena. Therefore, those objects and the consciousnesses possessing those objects are asserted as direct." Therefore, in this quotation, it is said that everything that exists according to worldly conventions is directly observable, and therefore, if something exists, the term "direct" applies. For this reason, a vase is a direct phenomenon. Therefore, it is said that a vase and the visual consciousness apprehending the vase are together two direct phenomena. So, the main reason why it is said that a manifest phenomenon and a direct phenomenon are synonymous is precisely because it is said in accordance with worldly conventions, as renowned in the world, without dismissing worldly conventions.
Why does the Prāsaṅgika school accept that a cognition can be both valid and erroneous regarding the same object, while other schools see this as a contradiction?
The question revolved around the key points, the reasons why the Madhyamaka philosophical system and the non-Madhyamaka philosophical systems assert or do not assert as valid cognition a consciousness that is erroneous regarding its own object. So, from the Vaibhāṣika to the Madhyamaka Svātantrika, according to these philosophical systems, for a cognition to be valid with respect to an object, this cognition must be non-erroneous regarding that same object. Since a consciousness is erroneous regarding its own object, it cannot be asserted as valid. Instead, in the Prāsaṅgika system, both a consciousness that is erroneous regarding its own object and a consciousness that is not erroneous can be asserted as valid cognition. Therefore, in the Prāsaṅgika system, it is accepted that an inferential consciousness, as well as all dualistic consciousnesses, is valid regarding what appears to it and at the same time erroneous regarding its object. So, the discussion revolves more or less around whether to accept or not that phenomena exist by their own characteristics (2).
For instance, in systems from Svātantrika downwards, if a cognition is valid with respect to a phenomenon, then it must be non-deceptive regarding that phenomenon. Conversely, if it is erroneous regarding that phenomenon, it becomes deceptive regarding that phenomenon. So ultimately, if a cognition is valid with respect to a phenomenon, it must be a cognition that is not erroneous regarding this object, which appears as if it exists by its own characteristics. Therefore, if a cognition is valid with respect to an object, this object must exist by its own characteristics, and the consciousness must be non-erroneous regarding the appearance of how the phenomenon exists, namely by its own characteristics. If the cognition is not erroneous regarding the appearance of the phenomenon that exists by its own characteristics, meaning that it is a valid cognition with respect to its own object, then the object must exist by its own characteristics, and it must be a valid cognition regarding the appearance of the phenomenon that exists by its own characteristics. It must also be non-erroneous regarding the appearance of the phenomenon that exists by its own characteristics. Therefore, if a consciousness is erroneous regarding this phenomenon, it is not possible to consider this consciousness as valid cognition. For example, in a system like Madhyamaka Svātantrika-Yogācāra, a visual consciousness apprehending a vase is erroneous regarding the appearance of the vase as an external object but is not erroneous regarding the vase [because they believe that the way the vase exists is by its own characteristics and since it appears so, the consciousness is not erroneous regarding the mode of existence of the vase]. This is what this system asserts. So, regarding being erroneous regarding the vase, when the visual consciousness is valid cognition regarding the vase, then it is valid cognition regarding the vase as a phenomenon that exists by its own characteristics, and if it is valid cognition regarding the vase that exists by its own characteristics, then it must be non-erroneous regarding the vase, and thus, it comes down to whether it is something that exists by its own characteristics.
Now, since in the Prāsaṅgika system it is not so, a cognition to be valid or not valid, erroneous or not erroneous, is explained [to be valid or not valid, etc.] solely because it has been imputed in one way or another. They do not justify [the validity of perception] based on the existence of phenomena, which are real/exist by their own characteristics. For the Prāsaṅgikas, a visual consciousness apprehending a vase, for example, is both a valid and erroneous cognition regarding the vase because to it, the vase appears as truly existent. Since the vase is not established in the way it appears, then that consciousness is erroneous regarding the vase. Without needing to say that this consciousness is erroneous regarding the appearance of the "true existence" of the vase, they say it is erroneous regarding a vase [since the vase presents itself as] truly existent. For the Prāsaṅgikas, for a cognition to be valid, it is not necessary for the perceived phenomenon to exist by its own characteristics. What is the source of these assertions? Je Tsong kha pa in the Essence of Eloquence says: "In a philosophical system that asserts that everything exists by its own essence, it is not possible for a consciousness to be erroneous regarding how the mode of existence of phenomena appears—existing by their own characteristics—and at the same time find its own object. Therefore, any valid cognition, whether conceptual or non-conceptual, must be non-erroneous regarding an apparent object or a determinate object that exists by its own characteristics (3), which are what that cognition became valid for. Therefore, for this reason, cognition must be valid regarding an object that is not merely designated conventionally or nominally but regarding its mode of abiding by its own nature or regarding its essence. This is what is accepted in their system."
This is what I have to say.
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(2) "Existence by its own characteristics" (Skt. svalaksana, Tib. rang mtshan) is understood as synonymous with "true existence" and as the opposite of "existence by mere imputation."
(3) The distinction between these two types of objects is made because in Buddhism perceptions are divided into direct and conceptual. A direct consciousness, such as visual consciousness perceiving the color blue, has both an apparent object and its object of comprehension as the color blue. This is because direct consciousness engages with things as they are without anything else hindering its perception. On the other hand, a conceptual consciousness engaging with blue has two different objects: the apparent object and a mental image of the generality of the color blue, while its object of comprehension is the color blue. Since its apparent object is already accepted as not blue but a conceptual image of blue, all Buddhist schools accept that the apparent object of a conceptual consciousness is not the blue that exists by its own characteristics. To justify the conceptual mind perceiving blue as valid compared to a conceptual mind perceiving a non-existent, they refer to the object of comprehension, which must be something that is real/unimputed/existing by its own characteristics. The citation refers to this distinction.
What is the reason why certain schools appeal to the self-awareness to justify the validity of perception?
The reason why certain systems accept the self-awareness is as follows: phenomena "dependent on another" (4) are established by their own nature, and the main reason is that among phenomena dependent on another, the primary one is the mind, which is established by its own nature. The focal point that is reached is that what allows establishing that the mind is established by its own nature is the self-awareness. Therefore, what is called self-awareness, that which experiences consciousness, must be non-erroneous regarding the appearance of consciousness as established by its own characteristics. So in this case, one must accept a mind that is not influenced by any cause of error and is not erroneous regarding the appearance of consciousness as established by its own characteristics. When seeking the referent of the designated object, it is established in dependence on the self-awareness. For example, the blue object, the fact of its conventional existence can be established in dependence on a consciousness apprehending blue, but the fact that the object possessor—the consciousness apprehending blue—exists conventionally cannot be established based on its object, blue. The reason is that while it is possible to establish the object depending on the object possessor, it is not possible to establish the object possessor depending on the object. Therefore, it is necessary to assert a self-awareness through which this object possessor is established. Since it is necessary to establish an object at the moment it is sought, then one ends up with the self-awareness.
There is one more thing to add: in the Vaibhāṣika system, what is direct does not necessarily have to be a consciousness. The sensory faculty of the eye is a valid direct phenomenon, and the source of this in the Vaibhāṣika system is found in the Abhidharmakośa, where it is stated: "The eyes see forms, not the consciousness that is supported by what is in relation, because the obstructed form is not seen." So when it comes to seeing a form by the visual consciousness, the form is not seen solely by the visual consciousness. Depending on the seeing of the form by the eye faculty, the visual consciousness sees the form. If it were only the visual consciousness seeing the form, then it should see all obstructive forms, but it does not. This is because the eye faculty does not see all obstructive forms. Since the sensory faculty does not see them, then the visual consciousness does not see them either. Therefore, there is a sensory faculty of the eye, and it is due to the seeing of the form by this sensory faculty that the visual consciousness sees the form. For this reason, the sensory faculty of the eye is a valid direct phenomenon, and thus in this system, using this as a reason, it is said that what is something validly direct does not necessarily have to be a consciousness.
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(4) some schools like the Cittamātra speak of three types of phenomena: imputed phenomena, phenomena empowered by another (where "another" refers to their causes, these phenomena are things that are produced by causes), and fully established phenomena (which is the ultimate nature of things—emptiness—the way they truly exist).
